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Abstract It is difficult to overstate the importance of identity in the digital age, as well as the importance of digitized
information for identity. In order to advance security, liberty, and privacy in modern society, it is crucial to under-
stand the nuances of what identity means and how it is used and abused. This article defines identity, covering both
physical and virtual entities, which is relevant in diverse contexts such as forensic science, cybersecurity, and national
security. This article concentrates on the relevance of identity in forensic science, and provides illustrative examples.
Approaches and challenges to evaluating and expressing confidence in identity-related conclusions are discussed.
Privacy issues are considered along with the rising risks of identity usurpation and impersonation. Relationships
between identification of physical and virtual entities are addressed, including the weaknesses and strengths of digital
information alone, and the benefits of combining multiple forensic disciplines when assessing identity. This article
concludes with a consideration of the benefits for forensic science specifically, and society generally, to take a
pluridisciplinary approach to establishing identity.
Introduction
Identity is established by authenticat-
ing that information characterizes a
specific entity in a given context,
during a certain time, with sufficient
confidence. Identity establishment
(identification) is essentially subjective
as it depends on an authenticator’s per-
spective and evaluation.
Forensic science and criminalistics have grown
out of the belief that every entity in the universe is
unique. The term individualization has been used to
describe the use of information to identify some-
thing to the exclusion of all others (Kirk, 1963;
Inman and Rudin, 2002). In practice, individualiza-
tion of an entity is only feasible within a specific
context and time, not universally (Champod and
Evett, 2001; Cole, 2009). SWGFAST (Scientific
Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study,
and Technology) has struggled with the term indi-
vidualization (SWGFAST, 2013). To reduce confu-
sion, forensic scientists are clarifying the distinction
between individuality and identification, and are
eschewing the use of individualization (Robertson
et al., 2016; Champod, 2013).
Identification is the decision process of establish-
ing, with sufficient confidence (not absolute cer-
tainty), that some identity-related information
describes a specific entity in a given context, at a
certain time (Jaquet-Chiffelle, 2009).
Identification can have probative value both in
the early investigation phase, to help narrow the
suspect pool and highlight missing information,
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and in later phases to support decisions in court
(Jackson et al., 2006). Decisions in the early inves-
tigation phase such as following leads typically re-
quire less confidence than the later conclusion
phases, particularly in court. The increasing
demand for forensic results to be expressed in an
unambiguous and transparent manner is motivat-
ing more formalization in how conclusions related
to identification are evaluated and expressed
(Biederman et al., 2016).
The understanding of identity has expanded to
encompass the evolution of virtual entities (Jaquet-
Chiffelle, 2009). In addition, there is increased
understanding that identity can change with the
context and time, such as a person’s virtual identity,
gender identity, or identity being usurped and mis-
used. The term identity usurpation is used instead
of identity theft ‘since identity is not something that
is typically stolen; unlike theft, where the owner
loses possession over the stolen good, the victim
of identity takeover still retains her identity’
(Koops et al., 2009). Taking all of these consider-
ations into account, a clearer definition of identity
has been developed, stated above and explained fur-
ther below.
This article begins with the nuances of identity
and how it is used in forensic science, explicates the
differences and connections between identities of
physical and digital/virtual entities, addresses un-
certainty and confidence in identity, and highlights
the growing concerns relating to identity, privacy
and criminality.
How is identity used?
Identity plays a role in many important functions of
daily life in modern society, both in the physical
world and cyberspace, including banking, shop-
ping, travelling, and voting. Certain misuses of
identity are considered crimes, including identity
creation (e.g. fake ID) and identity usurpation
(Koops et al., 2009). From a forensic perspective,
identity-related information is used to guide
investigative decisions and to help judges and
juries make decisions of innocence or guilt.
In forensic science, identity has many uses and
nuances both in the physical and digital realms.
Identity is not limited to people: things (material
and digital) and virtual entities also have identities.
Methods in forensic science that support identifi-
cation decisions deal both with full identities that
describe distinct entities, physical or virtual, and
with partial identities which place entities with cer-
tain shared characteristics into a particular class.
Another nuance is that forensic science can support
conclusions relating to the identity of a person or
thing to varying levels of confidence, short of ab-
solute certainty. In a criminal case, it might be ne-
cessary for decision makers to be convinced of
identity with extremely high confidence, whereas in
a civil case strong confidence might be sufficient,
and in a natural disaster moderate confidence
might be adequate. For instance, taking an indivi-
dual’s fingerprints and comparing them against a
database of previously collected information to
find potential matches might be sufficient to iden-
tify a body in a natural disaster, or even to consider
the person as a potential suspect in a criminal
investigation.
In certain situations, forensic analysis is used to
determine the nature of a trace (e.g. blood stain,
cocaine, elephant tusk), i.e. to find information
that confirms the class identity of a trace-entity
with sufficient confidence. When it is broadly ac-
cepted that the used analytical method is discrim-
inant enough, the decision about identity is not
necessarily left to the judge or the jury.
In other situations, more circumspection is
called for when assessing the strength of the link
between a known entity and observed traces, es-
pecially when the entity is the suspect—a possible
source of the litigious activity that produced the
observed traces. In such situations, the results of
forensic analysis should be evaluated and ex-
pressed in terms of the traces rather than the
entity. The final leap of faith is ultimately a
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decision for judges and juries, not for forensic
experts, as expressed in Jackson et al. (2006)
(with quotation from Doheny v Adams [1997] 1
Cr.App.R 369):
‘The scientist should not be asked his
opinion on the likelihood that it was
the defendant who left the crime
stain, nor when giving evidence
should he use terminology which may
lead the jury to believe that he is ex-
pressing such an opinion’ The likeli-
hood, or probability, that it was a
particular defendant who left a crime
stain depends not only on the strength
of the scientific evidence but also on the
combined strength of the other non-
scientific evidence. If a scientist gives
a view on the probability of the origin
of a crime stain, then that view will be
limited by the scientist’s inevitably par-
tial knowledge of the totality of the evi-
dence in a case. Potentially misleading
opinion could then be given.
When examining a disaster victim, when a body is
in bad condition, or when ante-mortem informa-
tion is sparse (both physical and digital), addressing
questions of identity can be difficult (Gremaud,
2010). Some murders attempt to fight forensic ana-
lysis by removing identity informative features
from their victims. However, it is difficult to sub-
tract all identity-information from a person,
including digital traces.
Case Example (Gaumer, Maryland,
2005): After killing Josie Phyllis
Brown, John Gaumer cut-off her
fingertips, jawbone, teeth, and nose in
an attempt to thwart identification of
her body. On the basis of cellular ser-
vice provider records, investigators
refuted Gaumer’s claim that he drove
her home after their date.
Inadvertently, while Gaumer was at-
tacking Brown, his mobile device
dialled her phone, resulting in a voice-
mail recording of the victim pleading
for her life and then being beaten to
death.
These digital traces of Brown’s last
movements and exclamations helped
investigators persuade Gaumer to
bring them to and identify her body
(McMenamin, 2006, 2007).
Another challenge is how to identify an unknown
offender using traces at a crime scene, such as bite
marks, hairs, fingerprints, and biological fluids.
Additionally, if the perpetrator carried a mobile
device, passed by CCTV systems, or drove through
toll booths while engaged in criminal activity, he
might have inadvertently generated digital traces
through cell towers, surveillance cameras, and
other information systems.
Case Example (Dwyer, Ireland, 2012):
Dwyer was convicted of killing Elaine
O’Hara, dumping her body in remote
woods, and throwing her personal pos-
sessions into a reservoir, including a set
of keys and the victim’s supermarket
loyalty card. Forensic examination of
the victim’s computer and mobile
device revealed a likely suspect
who was an architect named ‘Graham’
involved in online forums for
bondage-discipline-sadism-masochism
(BDSM), and interested in flying model
aeroplanes. Graham was careful to only
communicate with the victim using
phones that were not tied directly to
his identity. However, the location of
one of these phones and Dwyer’s per-
sonal phone was determined to be the
same over a period of time. On the basis
of phone locations at particular times
passing through toll gates, photos were
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obtained showing Dwyer’s license plate
passing through the toll gates. In add-
ition, analysis of semen stains found in
the victim’s bed provided a DNA profile
that was compatible with the profile of
Dwyer (Raidio´ Teilifı´s E´ireann, 2015;
Stack, 2015).
The process of finding Graham Dwyer demon-
strates the nuances of identity, including the dis-
tinction between physical and virtual entities, and
the usefulness of characteristics that have high se-
lectivity versus low selectivity as shown in Table 1.
In essence, characteristics with high selectivity pro-
vide distinctive identity-related information,
whereas characteristics with low selectivity only
provide information useful for establishing partial
identity. In certain circumstances, a physical ap-
pearance on CCTV can be highly selective, depend-
ing on the clarity and angle of the picture. Similarly,
a large quantity of accurate data points tracking an
individual’s location over a period can be highly
selective because a small number of people follow
the exact same path for very long.
Characteristics such as those in Table 1 can com-
bine to create a compelling picture of identity as
shown in Fig. 1.
What is identity, explicitly?
Before delving into the complexities and challenges
associated with identity, it is helpful to explicate
what constitutes identity in practical terms.
Characteristics to establish identity
The characteristics that can be useful for establish-
ing identity are varied, and extend into the digital
realm (Jaquet-Chiffelle, 2009). In terms of people,
such selective characteristics fall into the four cate-
gories in Table 2.
The fourth category (something that you do/
prefer) is becoming more prevalent in digitized
society. A simple example is a behavioural bio-
metric such as keystroke dynamics, which is
being used to identify people on the basis of
their distinctive typing patterns (Teh et al.,
2013). Various digital traces that a human
being generates simply by living in the modern
world can be combined to establish (partial)
identities, effectively creating a behavioural bio-
metric. For example, reconstituting a person’s
movements over time (between home, work,
etc.) on the basis of location data recorded by a
smartphone, SatNav device, or automobile can be
used to identify the individual to some degree of
confidence. Our likes and preferences can lead to
patterns such as shopping habits, which could
also be part of behavioural biometrics. Some fi-
nancial institutions verify identity by asking a
combination of questions about things you did
in the past; accumulation of things you did have
been described as biographical identity (Koops
et al., 2009).
Not only human beings
In the context of forensic science, any animate or
inanimate entity, physical or virtual, can be identi-
fied using selective characteristics. Some illustrative
examples:
Fauna and flora: when an animal tusk or skin is
found in a tourist’s luggage, forensic analysis might
be able to determine that it came from an endan-
gered species, potentially leading to criminal
charges. Some characteristics can be used to deter-
mine species, i.e. find the identity of a species, but
not the specific animal within a particular species,
while other characteristics can help establish the
identity of a specific animal in a species (Coquoz
and Taroni, 2006). Certain characteristics can be
used to relate entities to each other and their ap-
proximate location, potentially leading to crime
hotspots (Wasser et al., 2015).
Objects: a crime scene typically comprises many
traces that can be used to identify objects, including
patterns on shoeprints, treads on tiremarks, and
striations on bullets. Computers and mobile de-
vices have traces that are used to identify them
such as mobile equipment identifiers (e.g. IMEI),
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Table 1: Examples of high and low selectivity characteristics of physical and virtual entities
Entity High-selectivity characteristics Low-selectivity characteristics
Physical
(human being)
 DNA
 Face
 Is male
 Is named ‘Graham Dwyer’
 Is doing BDSM
 Is working as an architect
 Is a model aeroplane enthusiast
 Is married with children
 Is at location (L) at time(t)
 Physical appearance on CCTV
Virtual
(entity)
 Secret mobile phone number
(086-175-9076)
 Mobile phone number (087-210-0407)
 Car license plate number (99-G-11850)
 Email address (fetishboy@gmail.com)
 ‘Architect72’ (online pseudonym)
 ‘Graham’ (online pseudonym)
 Architect (role)
 Member of BDSM community (activity)
 Aeroplane enthusiast (interest)
 Married with children (status)
 Recorded at location (L) at time(t)
Figure 1: Characteristics of physical and digital/virtual entities combining to form a suspect’s identity.
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subscriber identifiers (IMSI) and advertising iden-
tifiers (e.g. IDFA). Some traces can be used to de-
termine the class of an object (class identity, i.e. a
partial identity for the objects of this class), and
others, which are more distinctive, allow to distin-
guish a specific object within its class, i.e. to estab-
lish its identity.
Locations: some landmarks, background terrain,
or other characteristics can be used to determine a
particular region, and others can reveal a specific
place in that area (Bolton, 2016). Under certain
conditions, the approximate location where a digi-
tal video was recorded can be identified using elec-
trical network frequency (ENF) analysis (Garg et
al., 2013).
Virtual: online activities can be associated with
virtual entities, which can complicate identity. A
virtual entity (persona) can be used to anonymize
online activities, effectively concealing the phys-
ical entity (human being) performing the actions.
Furthermore, a virtual entity can perform actions
without the direct involvement of a human
being, e.g. an autonomous system such as a
chatbot.
Case example: The Sweetie 2.0 chatbot
was developed to find online sexual
predators in video chatrooms. The
chatbot presents the face of a young
child, and responds to conversation
using preprogramed phrases. Even
though the chatbot is simplistic in its
interactions, this initiative has been
successful at finding sexual predators.
[http://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/
research/research-projects/law/
sweetie-2.0]
Uncertainty and confidence
in identity
Identity plays a critical role in many investigations,
even when it is partial. For instance, distinguishing
between shoeprints made by different kinds of
shoes can narrow the suspect pool to those people
with a specific make of shoe.
Uncertainty in identity
There is always some gap between identifying in-
formation and the actual thing (Robertson et al.,
2016). This gap is relatively small for forensic ana-
lysis of DNA, with a remote possibility of a suspect’s
DNA profile being compatible with more than one
human being. The challenge of linking identity in-
formation to the actual thing is exacerbated when
characteristics that comprise identity change over
time, or are usurped and misused. Wear patterns on
a shoe or tire can change with use over time.
Striations that a gun makes on a bullet can
change with use over time. Landmarks at a location
can be added or removed. An online persona (a
particular virtual person) can be used by a different
person in the future. Some companies reassign a
telephone number to a new customer after some
period of disuse by the previous customer. Even
the characteristics that are closely coupled with a
person (something you are) can change with age,
and can be digitized and falsified (Marcel et al.,
2014). When travelling across borders, some
criminals use fake identity documents to avoid de-
tection and apprehension.
Online, criminals use pseudonyms and online
personas to commit offenses and avoid apprehen-
sion. A pseudonym, or the identity of an online
persona, is an example of virtual identities, i.e. the
Table 2: Categorization of characteristics that are useful for establishing identity
Something you . . . Examples
Are Biometric features such as a fingerprint, voiceprint, retina, or face.
Have Passport, smartcard or SIM card (phone number)
Know/choose PIN, password
Do/prefer Behavioural biometrics or behavior patterns, or biographical identity
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identity of a virtual entity linked to the actual entity
of interest. For instance, a sex offender posed as a
young girl to befriend victims and introduce them
to the offender himself in order to create false trust.
As another example, criminals gain unauthorized
access to bank accounts by stealing account details
that are used to identify the owner. The various
ways in which identity can be changed (usurped,
exchanged, delegated, created) creates complexities
for security, investigations, and law (Koops et al.,
2009).
There are legitimate reasons to change or ‘spoof’
identity. People also use pseudonyms to protect
their official identities. For instance, famous
people use pseudonyms to protect their privacy.
People use virtual identities or personas in cyber-
space in order to operate anonymously. From yet
another perspective, forensic analysts might at-
tempt to spoof the fingerprint authentication on a
smartphone in order to acquire data from the
device, or use a virtual identity for a covert
investigation.
Forensic methods sometimes enlarge the gap be-
tween identifying information and the actual thing,
such as when imperfect preservation techniques are
applied in dynamic crime scene environments, or
when experimental studies are performed under
controlled conditions. Digital traces are further
separated from the physical entity generating
them, so establishing a link between them requires
assumptions which necessarily have some add-
itional uncertainty. Furthermore, errors in process-
ing and comparison can result in mistaken identity,
even with DNA, such as contamination that leads to
incorrect conclusions (Geddes, 2012).
With such uncertainties in mind, recall the dif-
ferent aspects of identity listed in Table 2: some-
thing you are (biometric features), something you
have (token, certificate), something you know
(PIN, password), and something you do/prefer. A
confluence of corroborating physical and digital
traces from multiple independent sources can
help establish what will be interpreted as an undeni-
able identity, as in the Graham Dwyer case
summarized above. Given the multifaceted nature
of identity, it can be difficult to evaluate the level of
confidence in a formal manner. Ultimately, the re-
liability of any identification process depends on
the competence, honesty, and belief of forensic ana-
lysts (Jaquet-Chiffelle, 2009). Proper assessment of
identification assumes that the forensic analyst per-
forming the work has the necessary knowledge and
abilities, has taken potential biases into account
and, ultimately, is trustworthy.
Evaluating and expressing confidence in
identity
A common goal of investigating criminal activity is
to apprehend the perpetrators, and make them ac-
countable for their crimes. At the same time, to
avoid injustice, it is necessary to seriously consider
the possibility that the accused is innocent. Forensic
analysts have a duty to resist pressures to target a
specific entity when evaluating identity, and avoid
confirmatory bias. Specifically, when evaluating
and expressing forensic results, forensic analysis
should focus on the observable physical and digital
traces, and not be aimed at implicating a specific
entity (Association of Forensic Science Providers,
2009).
Evaluating possible associations between identity
characteristics and a specific entity is not as
straightforward as it might seem. Many character-
istics provide some partial information about an
entity, but it is difficult to quantify how reliably a
given characteristic can be linked to a single entity.
The possibility exists that two people have very
similar hair or fingerprints, so a forensic analyst
could mistakenly identify the wrong person.
Certain information is perceived as more reliable
for establishing identity because it is more difficult
to alter (e.g. something you are). However, the sta-
bility of such identity-related information can
make it more of a target for identity usurpation
(Koops et al., 2009). Therefore, the authenticity of
such information must be assesses when it is used to
establish identity, rather than simply assuming that
it is reliable.
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It is sometimes possible to establish sufficient
confidence that ‘some given identity-related infor-
mation is valid and truly describes only one specific
entity in the given context, [and] then this entity is
(fully) identified, i.e. individualized, with this infor-
mation in this context from the point of view of the
[decision-maker]. If the [decision maker] con-
vinces himself that other entities can be truly
described by this information in this context, then
the identification is only partial from his point of
view.’ (Jaquet-Chiffelle, 2009)
The determination of what confidence level is
sufficient for establishing identity in a given context
involves setting thresholds. Fig. 2 depicts these
thresholds of confidence in identity on a con-
tinuum with confidence in non-identity (refutation
or distrust) to the left, confidence in identity to the
right, and equivocal or neutral (lack of confidence)
in the middle. The level of confidence can also be
represented using an ‘opinion triangle’ to support
more formal expression and opinion algebra
(Jaquet-Chiffelle, 2009).
Over the past 100 years, there have been signifi-
cant advances in the study of traces that can be used
to address questions of identity. However, many of
these advances in forensic science have not ad-
equately addressed questions of reliability. In
recent years, there is increasing concern regarding
unreliability of certain forensic observations for
purposes of establishing identity, and growing
awareness that methods of establishing identity do
not provide absolute certainty (National Research
Council, 2009). For instance, mistakes in bite-mark
analysis have led to dozens of wrongful convictions,
calling into question the reliability of methods for
comparing bite-marks to a suspect’s teeth
(Lussenhop, 2016). Similarly, an FBI study found
that over 250 cases (95% of the total number of
cases that were reviewed) involving hair evidence
had errors in expert testimony, raising questions
about the reliability of hair evidence for identifying
a person (Hsu, 2015; Norton et al., 2016). Concerns
about the reliability of fingerprint evidence have
also arisen in cases of mistaken identity, in large
part due to errors in the comparison process
(Cole, 2005; Stockdale et al., 2012) . As more mis-
uses of forensic science are uncovered, higher scru-
tiny and expectations are being placed on forensic
science as a whole (Garrett and Neufeld 2009).
In addition to on-going efforts to improve foren-
sic methods to support identification, there are
multiple initiatives to standardize how conclusions
are conveyed. The primary motivation for these ef-
forts is to eliminate ambiguous language such as the
assertion that an observation of a trace at the crime
scene ‘is consistent with’ a particular person being
at the crime scene. When a person’s liberty and
livelihood are at stake, or a dangerous criminal
could remain free and cause further harm, it is crit-
ical to use unambiguous language to state the level
of compatibility between a trace and its purported
source, weighed against alternative propositions.
Some groups use conclusions scales that have a
defined vocabulary to express confidence in foren-
sic results. One risk of using a conclusion scale is
that it can be used to target one entity, such as
stating that there is strong support for a given
entity given the observed traces, effectively favour-
ing one conclusion by not formally including an
evaluation of any alternate hypothesis. To address
this risk, the Organization of Scientific Area
Committees is developing guidelines for source
Figure 2: Decision about identity with thresholds for establishing identity (sufficient confidence in identity) versus
refuting identity (sufficient confidence in non-identity) adapted from Jaquet-Chiffelle (2009).
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conclusions that uses comparative language to ex-
press the support for one proposition compared
with the support for the opposite proposition.
To increase scientific rigour in forensic science,
there is an on-going effort to express conclusions
about identification as an expert decision in terms
of comparison of likelihoods (ENFSI, 2015). The
first evaluation is the strength or weight of the fo-
rensic observations given one account of the alleged
fact (generally the prosecution’s account) and the
second asks for the weight of the forensic observa-
tions given an alternative account of the events
(generally the defense alleged set of facts). For in-
stance, the likelihood ratio in favour of an identity
increases when there is a strong chance of making
the observations given the alleged identity and a
small chance of making these observations if an
unknown individual is at the source of the data.
This approach gives decision makers a basis for as-
sessing confidence of identification results that is
more formalized and numerical instead of a
verbal conclusion scale (Marquis et al. 2016).
The Ecole des Sciences Criminelles (ESC), School
of Criminal Justice, takes the stance of not giving an
implicit message of a factual certainty when report-
ing conclusions related to identity, or that the re-
sults alone can achieve 100% certainty or
definitively exclude any other alternative scenario.
Research and casework at the ESC are striving to
develop more effective ways to evaluate and express
the probative value of forensic findings. This focus
spans across physical and digital realms, from fin-
gerprints and handwriting to mobile devices and
the Internet of things (IoT).
Relationships between material
and digital/virtual identities
When it comes to attributing specific activities to a
human being, digital data has advantages and dis-
advantages over physical traces such as DNA and
fingerprints.
Although DNA and fingerprints have the advan-
tage of being physical in nature, they usually lack
contextual details such as when and how they came
to be in a particular place. For instance, finding a
fingerprint may be used to establish that a person
was present at a particular place, but not when.
Conversely, digitized fingerprints can have context-
ual details, including when they were generated and
used, providing more information to establish
identity. For example, a biometric authentication
system not only records the presence of a finger-
print, but also the time. Actually, some smart-
phones contain a combination of biometric,
location, and temporal details that can be useful
for establishing the identity of the user. Some finan-
cial services check the geolocation of where a trans-
action originates, and generate an alert when a
transaction occurs far away from the customer’s
usual or expected location.
Furthermore, certain biometric features only
exist when they are recorded, such as the human
voice. When investigating criminal activities invol-
ving virtual entities, being able to capture their
voice can provide a strong link to the human
being committing the offenses.
Case example: In criminal investiga-
tions, it may be possible to link a
human being to biometric information
found in digital traces, such as a voice-
print or fingerprint. In one child sexual
assault case, the offender was linked to
the offense by analysing a fingerprint
that was captured in one digital photo-
graph he had taken of a victim.
(Augenstein, 2015)
Prior to widespread use of anonymizing technology
such as The Onion Router (Tor), online activities
could be tracked back to the Internet Service
Provider account (virtual entity) on the basis of
the IP address used during the time period.
Internet Service Providers (ISP) could provide law
enforcement with the customer details for the
Internet account, and sometimes the phone
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number used to connect at the specific time. This
type of information has been used extensively in
criminal investigations to establish the identity of
the human being who performed the crime.
Case Example (Travis, St. Louis, 2002):
Maury Roy Travis, who was convicted
for serial homicide, was apprehended
after he sent a letter to a reporter that
contained a map generated from a web-
site (Bryan, 2002). The act of plotting a
map left a cybertrail that law enforce-
ment used to determine the ISP
account used to generate the online
map, and with the help of ISP records,
the name and address of Travis. Some
surveillance of Travis’s home was per-
formed to establish confidence that he
was the actual person being sought.
Even with the advent of virtual currencies such as
BitCoin that support pseudonymity, these systems
retain detailed records of all transactions. When
BitCoins are used for illegal purposes, investigators
can sometimes identify the perpetrator by deter-
mining the owner of the associated wallet. In
other cases, investigators have identified the thief
when he transferred the BitCoins into currencies in
the physical world (Jeong, 2015).
Mobile devices and smartphone apps generate
substantial amounts of geolocation information,
on the device itself, and on cellular and cloud ser-
vice provider networks. Such information asso-
ciated with a specific subscriber’s mobile device
can be used to track an individual’s movements
over time.
There are subtle errors that can arise while fol-
lowing cybertrails, such as mistyping the IP ad-
dress when requesting ISP records, or specifying
the wrong timezone. Geolocation information on
mobile devices can be inaccurate due to variations
in signal quality or sampling, and can be inten-
tionally altered using a GPS spoofing app. Errors
in digital traces can result in law enforcement mis-
takenly searching the wrong location and
interrogating the wrong person. Geolocation
data from cell towers (or mobile devices, vehicles,
etc.) might indicate that a given suspect was near
the crime scene at a given time. However, bias and
mistakes can occur when analysis only considers
‘a prosecution hypothesis when there is a defence
hypothesis available, or [optimise the] likelihood
of detecting all serving cells when surveying a lo-
cation highlighted by the instructing agency
while providing a cursory examination of alterna-
tive scenarios, for example an alibi location.’ (UK
Forensic Science Regulator, 2015). Complexities
also arise when multiple people share a vir-
tual identity such as a mobile device, vehicle,
computer, IP addresses, or Internet account.
Linking a virtual person to a physical one can
become much more challenging. It is necessary to
address the questions: How do we know we have
the right person? How do we know that the identi-
fied person is the actual source of the activity?
Stated in terms of a likelihood ratio, what is the
likelihood that we have the right person, versus
the likelihood that we have the wrong person?
Furthermore, with the increasing amount of iden-
tity usurpation, it is also necessary to consider the
question: How do we know if someone has ‘stolen’
an identity?
In some circumstances, it can be difficult to es-
tablish a link between digital activities and a phys-
ical entity with sufficient confidence for forensic
purposes, particularly when dealing with criminals
who are actively trying to avoid apprehension.
However, computer systems have the advantage
of being copious. Ubiquitous devices retain sub-
stantial amounts of detailed information about
physical and virtual activities that can provide
high and low selectivity characteristics useful for
establishing identity.
A powerful approach to establishing relation-
ships between material and digital/virtual identities
is to combine digital traces with traditional police
work, as well as traditional forensic analysis meth-
ods. When investigating sale of illegal substances
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via the Internet, forensic analysis of the materials
correlated with both physical and online selling
sources can provide a more complete reconstruc-
tion of the criminal organization (Pineau et al.,
2015). When bank thieves equip cash machines
with skimming devices, the only way to identify
the offenders might be to perform physical surveil-
lance until they come back to collect stolen infor-
mation. As demonstrated in the Graham Dwyer
case, combining multiple forensic disciplines can
be very effective when trying to establish identity
in violent crime investigations. The ESC empha-
sizes this transdiciplinary approach, integrating fo-
rensic science disciplines in teaching, research, and
expertise in the forensic laboratory supporting
casework in criminal matters. This coordinated ap-
proach recognizes that a case cannot usually be
solved by one piece of information alone, and
that the concept of identity in our modern society
must take into account both physical and digital
traces.
Growing concerns: privacy and
illegal access to identity
information
The exposure of identities to criminals, govern-
ments, and private industry is an increasing con-
cern. Given the number and size of data breaches
and rising risk of government surveillance, it is rea-
sonable to assume that everyone has had some
identity-related information stolen or monitored.
In response to these risks, commercial ventures
such as Evernym.com are developing systems to
provide enhanced security and control over virtual
identities. Governments are also addressing these
concerns with updated legislation. In 2014, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that the
2006 EU Data Retention Directive breaches the
‘citizens fundamental rights to respect for private
life and communications and to the protection of
their personal data’ (EU Court of Justice, 2014). In
an effort to overturn his conviction for murder,
Graham Dwyer is using this ECJ decision to chal-
lenge the legality of the use of digital traces that
helped establish his identity. In 2016, the EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was
approved in an effort to address deficiencies in
prior legislation.
There are also growing concerns that identities
might be linked to the incorrect person, particularly
with virtual identities. As illegal access to identity
information becomes more prevalent in the digital
age (passport numbers, ID cards, bank accounts),
there is rising risk that activities will be performed
by an impersonator using stolen identity informa-
tion or biometric spoofing. Questions of reliability
in virtual identity and partial identity using digital
traces will continue to be a challenge in the decades
ahead.
Furthermore, the majority of people do not take
precautions to protect their online activities. As a
result, there are increasing opportunities for ana-
lysts to link people with something they do or like.
Businesses are sharing customer information for
marketing purposes, aggregating previously sepa-
rated aspects of our lives, such as banking activities
combined with shopping patterns. As a result, com-
mercial organizations can analyse digital activities
and identities to learn more about consumer habits
and to target online marketing. This kind of data
analysis and categorization is not necessarily accur-
ate and can impinge upon personal privacy
(Ellenberg, 2014). Similar data analysis methods
can be useful in criminal investigations, but there
are growing concerns over bulk data collection and
government surveillance. Proponents of the UK
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 claim that broad
access to digital data by governmental entities is
necessary for security, whereas opponents claim
that this unprecedented access is not proportionate
and encroaches too much on privacy.
Recommendations for updated legislation and
policy have emerged the FIDIS (The Future of
Identity in the Information Society) EU Project in
an effort to address these complex challenges,
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including identity-related crime (Koops et al.,
2009).
Conclusions
Identities do matter, both from a policing perspec-
tive and for the future of society in a digital age.
Identity is earning significant attention in forensic
science, with questions about reliability of existing
methods to establish identity, and emerging chal-
lenges posed by new technology. Forensic scientists
are working to increase the reliability of current
identification techniques, and to develop new
methods for establishing identity using digital
traces, and clearer ways to express conclusions
about the confidence of an identity. At the same
time, heightened awareness of data breaches and
government surveillance is motivating govern-
ments and companies to address concerns about
privacy and illegal access to identity information.
If these efforts are successful, forensic scientists,
governments, and commercial organizations will
have more powerful ways to establish identity com-
bining physical and digital information. As more
identity information is collected into databases,
consideration must be given to the increased prob-
ability of coincidental collisions, and ways to miti-
gate such risk such as maintaining separate smaller
databases for specific purposes. In addition, con-
trols must be placed around identity information
to protect privacy and security. The future will
bring new challenges—storing and sharing more
identity information will continue to have risks of
misuse and misidentification. The pluridisciplinary
approach of the ESC combines forensic disciplines
to obtain a stronger comprehension of identity. The
resulting insights are critical in forensic science and
can support broader applications in society, par-
ticularly with the increasing reliance on virtual
identities for protecting safety and privacy.
Always keep in mind that identification is a deci-
sion process with a threshold, not an absolute
certainty.
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